INDIRECT CONTEMPT
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Under Section 3, Rule 29 of the Rules, if a party or an officer or managing agent of a party refuses
to obey an order to produce any document or other things for inspection, copying, or
photographing or to permit it to be done, the court may make such orders as are just. The
enumeration of options given to the court under Section 3, Rule 29 of the Rules is not exclusive,
as shown by the phrase “among others.” Thus, in Republic v. Sandiganbayan, We said: To ensure
that availment of the modes of discovery is otherwise untrammeled and efficacious, the law imposes serious sanctions on the party who refuses to make discovery, such as dismissing the action or proceeding or part thereof, or rendering judgment by default against the disobedient party; contempt of court, or arrest of the party or agent of the party; payment of the amount of reasonable expenses incurred in obtaining a court order to compel discovery; taking the matters inquired into as established in accordance with the claim of the party seeking discovery;
refusal to allow the disobedient party support or oppose designated claims or defenses; striking
out pleadings or parts thereof; staying further proceedings. If adjudged guilty of
indirect contempt, the respondent who committed it against a Regional Trial Court or a
court of equivalent or higher rank may be punished with a fine not exceeding thirty thousand pesos, or imprisonment not exceeding six (6) months, or both.
In this case, the threatened sanction of possibly ordering petitioners to solidarily pay a fine of
P10,000.00 for every day of delay in complying with the September 10, 2002 Order is well within the allowable range of penalty.
As far as the proceedings for indirect contempt is concerned, the case of Baculi v. Judge Belen
is instructive:x x x Under the Rules of Court, there are two ways of initiating indirect contempt
proceedings:
(1) motu proprio by the court; or
(2) by a verified petition.
The recourse provided for in the above-mentioned provision is clear enough: the person adjudged
in indirect contempt must file an appeal under Rule 41 (Appeal from the Regional Trial Courts)
and post a bond for its suspension pendente lite. Obviously, these were not done in this case.
Instead, petitioners filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules and did not post the
required bond, effectively making the September 3, 2007 Resolution final and executory.
GOLF & COUNTRY CLUB, INC. and PABLO B. ROMAN, JR.,
Petitioners, -versus
MANUEL SANCHEZ, Respondent
G.R. No. 182738
Feb. 24, 2014
Friday, May 29, 2015
Tuesday, May 12, 2015
Civil Law: Unenforceable Contracts, Express vs Constructive Trusts, Prescriptive Period
The Court finds it erroneous for the CA to ignore the fact that the laymen's committee objected to the sale of the lot in question. The Canons require that ALL the church entities listed in Article IV(a) thereof should give its approval to the transaction. Thus, when the Supreme Bishop executed the contract of sale of petitioner's lot despite the opposition made by the laymen's committee, he acted beyond his powers. This case clearly falls under the category of unenforceable contracts mentioned in Article 1403, paragraph (1) of the Civil Code, which provides,thus:Art.1403. The following contracts are unenforceable, unless they are ratified:(1)Those entered into in the name of another person by one who has been given no authority or legal representation, or who has acted beyond his powers;In Mercado v. Allied Banking Corporation,13the Court explained that:x x x Unenforceable contracts are those which cannot be enforced by a proper action in court, unless they are ratified, because either they are entered into without or in excess of authority or they do not comply with the statute of frauds or both of the contracting parties do not possess the required legal capacity. x x x.
the Court affirmed the trial court's ruling that the applicable provision of law in such cases is Article 1456 of the Civil Code which states that “[i]f property is acquired through mistake or fraud, the person obtaining it is, by force of law, considereda trustee of an implied trust for the benefit of the person from whom the property comes.” Thus, in Aznar Brothers Realty Company v. Aying,19citing Vda. de Esconde,20the Court clarified the concept of trust involved in said provision, to wit
A deeper analysis of Article 1456 reveals that it is not a trust in the technical sense for in a typical trust, confidence is reposed in one person who is named a trustee for the benefit of another who is called the cestui que trust, respecting property which is held by the trustee for the benefit of the cestui quetrust. A constructive trust, unlike an express trust, does not emanate from, or generate a fiduciary relation. While in an express trust, a beneficiary and a trustee are linked by confidential or fiduciary relations, in a constructive trust, there is neither a promise nor any fiduciary relation to speak of and the so-called trustee neither accepts any trust nor intends holding the property for the beneficiary.
The concept of constructive trusts was further elucidated in the same case, as follows:. . . implied trusts are those which, without being expressed, are deducible from the nature of the transaction as matters of intent or which are superinduced on the transaction by operation of law as matters of equity, independently of the particular intention of the parties. In turn, implied trusts are either resulting or constructive trusts. These two are differentiated from each other as follows:Resulting trusts are based on the equitable doctrine that valuable consideration and not legal title determines the equitable title or interest and are presumed always to have been contemplated by the parties. They arise from the nature of circumstances of the consideration involved in a transaction whereby one person thereby becomes invested with legal title but is obligated in equity to hold his legal title for the benefit of another. On the other hand, constructive trusts are created by the construction of equity in order to satisfy the demands of justice and prevent unjust enrichment. They arise contrary to intention against one who, by fraud, duress or abuse of confidence, obtains or holds the legal right to property which he ought not, in equity and good conscience, to hold.(Italicssupplied)
In Aznar,the Court explained the basis for the prescriptive period, to wit:x x x under the
present Civil Code, we find that just as an implied or constructive trust is an offspring of
the law (Art. 1456, Civil Code), so is the corresponding obligation to reconvey the property
and the title thereto in favor of the true owner. In this context, and vis-รก-vis prescription,
Article 1144 of the Civil Code is applicable.
The following actions must be brought within
ten years from the time the right of action
accrues:
(1) Upon a written contract;
(2) Upon an obligation created by law;
(3) Upon a judgment.x x x x x x x x x
An action for reconveyance based on an implied or constructive trust must perforce prescribe
in ten years and not otherwise. A long line of decisions of this Court, and of very recent
vintage at that, illustrates this rule. Undoubtedly, it is now well-settled that an action for reconveyance based on an implied or constructive trust prescribes in ten years from the issuance of the Torrens title over the property. It has also been ruled that the ten-year prescriptive period begins to run from the date of registration of the deed or the date of the issuance of the certificate
of title over the property, x x x.
G.R. No. 179597. February 3, 2014
Iglesia Felipina Independiente Vs. Heirs
of Bernardino Taeza
the Court affirmed the trial court's ruling that the applicable provision of law in such cases is Article 1456 of the Civil Code which states that “[i]f property is acquired through mistake or fraud, the person obtaining it is, by force of law, considereda trustee of an implied trust for the benefit of the person from whom the property comes.” Thus, in Aznar Brothers Realty Company v. Aying,19citing Vda. de Esconde,20the Court clarified the concept of trust involved in said provision, to wit
A deeper analysis of Article 1456 reveals that it is not a trust in the technical sense for in a typical trust, confidence is reposed in one person who is named a trustee for the benefit of another who is called the cestui que trust, respecting property which is held by the trustee for the benefit of the cestui quetrust. A constructive trust, unlike an express trust, does not emanate from, or generate a fiduciary relation. While in an express trust, a beneficiary and a trustee are linked by confidential or fiduciary relations, in a constructive trust, there is neither a promise nor any fiduciary relation to speak of and the so-called trustee neither accepts any trust nor intends holding the property for the beneficiary.
The concept of constructive trusts was further elucidated in the same case, as follows:. . . implied trusts are those which, without being expressed, are deducible from the nature of the transaction as matters of intent or which are superinduced on the transaction by operation of law as matters of equity, independently of the particular intention of the parties. In turn, implied trusts are either resulting or constructive trusts. These two are differentiated from each other as follows:Resulting trusts are based on the equitable doctrine that valuable consideration and not legal title determines the equitable title or interest and are presumed always to have been contemplated by the parties. They arise from the nature of circumstances of the consideration involved in a transaction whereby one person thereby becomes invested with legal title but is obligated in equity to hold his legal title for the benefit of another. On the other hand, constructive trusts are created by the construction of equity in order to satisfy the demands of justice and prevent unjust enrichment. They arise contrary to intention against one who, by fraud, duress or abuse of confidence, obtains or holds the legal right to property which he ought not, in equity and good conscience, to hold.(Italicssupplied)
In Aznar,the Court explained the basis for the prescriptive period, to wit:x x x under the
present Civil Code, we find that just as an implied or constructive trust is an offspring of
the law (Art. 1456, Civil Code), so is the corresponding obligation to reconvey the property
and the title thereto in favor of the true owner. In this context, and vis-รก-vis prescription,
Article 1144 of the Civil Code is applicable.
The following actions must be brought within
ten years from the time the right of action
accrues:
(1) Upon a written contract;
(2) Upon an obligation created by law;
(3) Upon a judgment.x x x x x x x x x
An action for reconveyance based on an implied or constructive trust must perforce prescribe
in ten years and not otherwise. A long line of decisions of this Court, and of very recent
vintage at that, illustrates this rule. Undoubtedly, it is now well-settled that an action for reconveyance based on an implied or constructive trust prescribes in ten years from the issuance of the Torrens title over the property. It has also been ruled that the ten-year prescriptive period begins to run from the date of registration of the deed or the date of the issuance of the certificate
of title over the property, x x x.
G.R. No. 179597. February 3, 2014
Iglesia Felipina Independiente Vs. Heirs
of Bernardino Taeza
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