INDIRECT CONTEMPT
-------------------------------
Under Section 3, Rule 29 of the Rules, if a party or an officer or managing agent of a party refuses
to obey an order to produce any document or other things for inspection, copying, or
photographing or to permit it to be done, the court may make such orders as are just. The
enumeration of options given to the court under Section 3, Rule 29 of the Rules is not exclusive,
as shown by the phrase “among others.” Thus, in Republic v. Sandiganbayan, We said: To ensure
that availment of the modes of discovery is otherwise untrammeled and efficacious, the law imposes serious sanctions on the party who refuses to make discovery, such as dismissing the action or proceeding or part thereof, or rendering judgment by default against the disobedient party; contempt of court, or arrest of the party or agent of the party; payment of the amount of reasonable expenses incurred in obtaining a court order to compel discovery; taking the matters inquired into as established in accordance with the claim of the party seeking discovery;
refusal to allow the disobedient party support or oppose designated claims or defenses; striking
out pleadings or parts thereof; staying further proceedings. If adjudged guilty of
indirect contempt, the respondent who committed it against a Regional Trial Court or a
court of equivalent or higher rank may be punished with a fine not exceeding thirty thousand pesos, or imprisonment not exceeding six (6) months, or both.
In this case, the threatened sanction of possibly ordering petitioners to solidarily pay a fine of
P10,000.00 for every day of delay in complying with the September 10, 2002 Order is well within the allowable range of penalty.
As far as the proceedings for indirect contempt is concerned, the case of Baculi v. Judge Belen
is instructive:x x x Under the Rules of Court, there are two ways of initiating indirect contempt
proceedings:
(1) motu proprio by the court; or
(2) by a verified petition.
The recourse provided for in the above-mentioned provision is clear enough: the person adjudged
in indirect contempt must file an appeal under Rule 41 (Appeal from the Regional Trial Courts)
and post a bond for its suspension pendente lite. Obviously, these were not done in this case.
Instead, petitioners filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules and did not post the
required bond, effectively making the September 3, 2007 Resolution final and executory.
GOLF & COUNTRY CLUB, INC. and PABLO B. ROMAN, JR.,
Petitioners, -versus
MANUEL SANCHEZ, Respondent
G.R. No. 182738
Feb. 24, 2014
Friday, May 29, 2015
Tuesday, May 12, 2015
Civil Law: Unenforceable Contracts, Express vs Constructive Trusts, Prescriptive Period
The Court finds it erroneous for the CA to ignore the fact that the laymen's committee objected to the sale of the lot in question. The Canons require that ALL the church entities listed in Article IV(a) thereof should give its approval to the transaction. Thus, when the Supreme Bishop executed the contract of sale of petitioner's lot despite the opposition made by the laymen's committee, he acted beyond his powers. This case clearly falls under the category of unenforceable contracts mentioned in Article 1403, paragraph (1) of the Civil Code, which provides,thus:Art.1403. The following contracts are unenforceable, unless they are ratified:(1)Those entered into in the name of another person by one who has been given no authority or legal representation, or who has acted beyond his powers;In Mercado v. Allied Banking Corporation,13the Court explained that:x x x Unenforceable contracts are those which cannot be enforced by a proper action in court, unless they are ratified, because either they are entered into without or in excess of authority or they do not comply with the statute of frauds or both of the contracting parties do not possess the required legal capacity. x x x.
the Court affirmed the trial court's ruling that the applicable provision of law in such cases is Article 1456 of the Civil Code which states that “[i]f property is acquired through mistake or fraud, the person obtaining it is, by force of law, considereda trustee of an implied trust for the benefit of the person from whom the property comes.” Thus, in Aznar Brothers Realty Company v. Aying,19citing Vda. de Esconde,20the Court clarified the concept of trust involved in said provision, to wit
A deeper analysis of Article 1456 reveals that it is not a trust in the technical sense for in a typical trust, confidence is reposed in one person who is named a trustee for the benefit of another who is called the cestui que trust, respecting property which is held by the trustee for the benefit of the cestui quetrust. A constructive trust, unlike an express trust, does not emanate from, or generate a fiduciary relation. While in an express trust, a beneficiary and a trustee are linked by confidential or fiduciary relations, in a constructive trust, there is neither a promise nor any fiduciary relation to speak of and the so-called trustee neither accepts any trust nor intends holding the property for the beneficiary.
The concept of constructive trusts was further elucidated in the same case, as follows:. . . implied trusts are those which, without being expressed, are deducible from the nature of the transaction as matters of intent or which are superinduced on the transaction by operation of law as matters of equity, independently of the particular intention of the parties. In turn, implied trusts are either resulting or constructive trusts. These two are differentiated from each other as follows:Resulting trusts are based on the equitable doctrine that valuable consideration and not legal title determines the equitable title or interest and are presumed always to have been contemplated by the parties. They arise from the nature of circumstances of the consideration involved in a transaction whereby one person thereby becomes invested with legal title but is obligated in equity to hold his legal title for the benefit of another. On the other hand, constructive trusts are created by the construction of equity in order to satisfy the demands of justice and prevent unjust enrichment. They arise contrary to intention against one who, by fraud, duress or abuse of confidence, obtains or holds the legal right to property which he ought not, in equity and good conscience, to hold.(Italicssupplied)
In Aznar,the Court explained the basis for the prescriptive period, to wit:x x x under the
present Civil Code, we find that just as an implied or constructive trust is an offspring of
the law (Art. 1456, Civil Code), so is the corresponding obligation to reconvey the property
and the title thereto in favor of the true owner. In this context, and vis-รก-vis prescription,
Article 1144 of the Civil Code is applicable.
The following actions must be brought within
ten years from the time the right of action
accrues:
(1) Upon a written contract;
(2) Upon an obligation created by law;
(3) Upon a judgment.x x x x x x x x x
An action for reconveyance based on an implied or constructive trust must perforce prescribe
in ten years and not otherwise. A long line of decisions of this Court, and of very recent
vintage at that, illustrates this rule. Undoubtedly, it is now well-settled that an action for reconveyance based on an implied or constructive trust prescribes in ten years from the issuance of the Torrens title over the property. It has also been ruled that the ten-year prescriptive period begins to run from the date of registration of the deed or the date of the issuance of the certificate
of title over the property, x x x.
G.R. No. 179597. February 3, 2014
Iglesia Felipina Independiente Vs. Heirs
of Bernardino Taeza
the Court affirmed the trial court's ruling that the applicable provision of law in such cases is Article 1456 of the Civil Code which states that “[i]f property is acquired through mistake or fraud, the person obtaining it is, by force of law, considereda trustee of an implied trust for the benefit of the person from whom the property comes.” Thus, in Aznar Brothers Realty Company v. Aying,19citing Vda. de Esconde,20the Court clarified the concept of trust involved in said provision, to wit
A deeper analysis of Article 1456 reveals that it is not a trust in the technical sense for in a typical trust, confidence is reposed in one person who is named a trustee for the benefit of another who is called the cestui que trust, respecting property which is held by the trustee for the benefit of the cestui quetrust. A constructive trust, unlike an express trust, does not emanate from, or generate a fiduciary relation. While in an express trust, a beneficiary and a trustee are linked by confidential or fiduciary relations, in a constructive trust, there is neither a promise nor any fiduciary relation to speak of and the so-called trustee neither accepts any trust nor intends holding the property for the beneficiary.
The concept of constructive trusts was further elucidated in the same case, as follows:. . . implied trusts are those which, without being expressed, are deducible from the nature of the transaction as matters of intent or which are superinduced on the transaction by operation of law as matters of equity, independently of the particular intention of the parties. In turn, implied trusts are either resulting or constructive trusts. These two are differentiated from each other as follows:Resulting trusts are based on the equitable doctrine that valuable consideration and not legal title determines the equitable title or interest and are presumed always to have been contemplated by the parties. They arise from the nature of circumstances of the consideration involved in a transaction whereby one person thereby becomes invested with legal title but is obligated in equity to hold his legal title for the benefit of another. On the other hand, constructive trusts are created by the construction of equity in order to satisfy the demands of justice and prevent unjust enrichment. They arise contrary to intention against one who, by fraud, duress or abuse of confidence, obtains or holds the legal right to property which he ought not, in equity and good conscience, to hold.(Italicssupplied)
In Aznar,the Court explained the basis for the prescriptive period, to wit:x x x under the
present Civil Code, we find that just as an implied or constructive trust is an offspring of
the law (Art. 1456, Civil Code), so is the corresponding obligation to reconvey the property
and the title thereto in favor of the true owner. In this context, and vis-รก-vis prescription,
Article 1144 of the Civil Code is applicable.
The following actions must be brought within
ten years from the time the right of action
accrues:
(1) Upon a written contract;
(2) Upon an obligation created by law;
(3) Upon a judgment.x x x x x x x x x
An action for reconveyance based on an implied or constructive trust must perforce prescribe
in ten years and not otherwise. A long line of decisions of this Court, and of very recent
vintage at that, illustrates this rule. Undoubtedly, it is now well-settled that an action for reconveyance based on an implied or constructive trust prescribes in ten years from the issuance of the Torrens title over the property. It has also been ruled that the ten-year prescriptive period begins to run from the date of registration of the deed or the date of the issuance of the certificate
of title over the property, x x x.
G.R. No. 179597. February 3, 2014
Iglesia Felipina Independiente Vs. Heirs
of Bernardino Taeza
Thursday, April 23, 2015
TAXATION - "Verba Legis Doctrine"
TAXATION - "verba legis doctrine"
G.R. No. 197760. January 13, 2014
Team Energy Corporation (formerly Mirant Pagbilao Corp.)
Vs. Commissioner of Internal Revenue
Recently, however, in the consolidated cases of Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. San Roque Power Corporation10(San Roque ponencia),this Court emphasized that Section 112(A) and (C)of the Tax Code must be interpreted according to its clear,plainand unequivocal language. In said case, we held that the taxpayer can file his administrative claim for refund or issuance of tax credit certificate anytime within the two-year prescriptive period. If he files his claim on the last day of the two-year prescriptive period, his claim is still filed on time. The Commissioner will then have 120 days from such filing to decide the claim. If the Commissioner decides the claim on the 120thday or does not decide it on that day, the taxpayer still has 30 days to file his judicial claim with the CTA. Thus, the Court expounded
This law is clear, plain and unequivocal. Following the well-settled verbalegis doctrine, this law should be applied exactly as worded since it is clear, plain and unequivocal. As this law states, the taxpayer may, if he wishes, appeal the decision of the Commissionerto the CTA within 30 days from receipt of the Commissioner’s decision, or if the Commissioner does not act on the taxpayer’s claim within the 120-day period, the taxpayer may appeal to the CTA within 30 days from the expiration of the 120-day period
First, Section 112 clearly, plainly and unequivocally provides that the taxpayer “may, within two (2) years after the close of the taxable quarter when the sales were made, apply for the issuance of a tax credit certificate or refundof the creditable input tax due or paid to such sales.”In short, the law states that the taxpayer may apply with the Commissioner for a refund or credit “within two (2) years,” which means at anytime within two years. Thus, the applicationfor refund or credit may be filed by the taxpayer with the Commissioner on the last day of the two-year prescriptive period and it will still strictly comply with the law.The two-year prescriptive period is a grace period in favor of the taxpayer and he can avail of the full period before his right to apply for a tax refund or credit is barred by prescription
Second, Section 112(C) provides that the Commissioner shall decide the application for refund or credit “within one hundred twenty (120) days from the date of submission of complete documents in support of the application filed in accordancewith Subsection (A).”The reference in Section 112(C) of the submission of documents “in support of the application filed in accordance with Subsection (A)” means that the application in Section 112(A) is theadministrative claim that the Commissioner must decide within the 120-day period. In short, the two-year prescriptive periodin Section 112(A) refers to the period within which the taxpayer can file an administrative claim for tax refund or credit.Stated otherwise, the two-year prescriptive period does not refer to the filing of the judicial claim with the CTA but to the filing of the administrative claim with the Commissioner. As held in Aichi, the “phrase ‘within two years x x x apply for the issuance of a tax credit or refund” refers to applications for refund/credit with the CIR and not to appeals made to the CTA.”
G.R. No. 197760. January 13, 2014
Team Energy Corporation (formerly Mirant Pagbilao Corp.)
Vs. Commissioner of Internal Revenue
Recently, however, in the consolidated cases of Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. San Roque Power Corporation10(San Roque ponencia),this Court emphasized that Section 112(A) and (C)of the Tax Code must be interpreted according to its clear,plainand unequivocal language. In said case, we held that the taxpayer can file his administrative claim for refund or issuance of tax credit certificate anytime within the two-year prescriptive period. If he files his claim on the last day of the two-year prescriptive period, his claim is still filed on time. The Commissioner will then have 120 days from such filing to decide the claim. If the Commissioner decides the claim on the 120thday or does not decide it on that day, the taxpayer still has 30 days to file his judicial claim with the CTA. Thus, the Court expounded
This law is clear, plain and unequivocal. Following the well-settled verbalegis doctrine, this law should be applied exactly as worded since it is clear, plain and unequivocal. As this law states, the taxpayer may, if he wishes, appeal the decision of the Commissionerto the CTA within 30 days from receipt of the Commissioner’s decision, or if the Commissioner does not act on the taxpayer’s claim within the 120-day period, the taxpayer may appeal to the CTA within 30 days from the expiration of the 120-day period
First, Section 112 clearly, plainly and unequivocally provides that the taxpayer “may, within two (2) years after the close of the taxable quarter when the sales were made, apply for the issuance of a tax credit certificate or refundof the creditable input tax due or paid to such sales.”In short, the law states that the taxpayer may apply with the Commissioner for a refund or credit “within two (2) years,” which means at anytime within two years. Thus, the applicationfor refund or credit may be filed by the taxpayer with the Commissioner on the last day of the two-year prescriptive period and it will still strictly comply with the law.The two-year prescriptive period is a grace period in favor of the taxpayer and he can avail of the full period before his right to apply for a tax refund or credit is barred by prescription
Second, Section 112(C) provides that the Commissioner shall decide the application for refund or credit “within one hundred twenty (120) days from the date of submission of complete documents in support of the application filed in accordancewith Subsection (A).”The reference in Section 112(C) of the submission of documents “in support of the application filed in accordance with Subsection (A)” means that the application in Section 112(A) is theadministrative claim that the Commissioner must decide within the 120-day period. In short, the two-year prescriptive periodin Section 112(A) refers to the period within which the taxpayer can file an administrative claim for tax refund or credit.Stated otherwise, the two-year prescriptive period does not refer to the filing of the judicial claim with the CTA but to the filing of the administrative claim with the Commissioner. As held in Aichi, the “phrase ‘within two years x x x apply for the issuance of a tax credit or refund” refers to applications for refund/credit with the CIR and not to appeals made to the CTA.”
Tuesday, March 24, 2015
ESTAFA
As borne by the records, the criminal charge stemmed from the failure of the
petitioner to return or remit the proceeds of jewelries amounting to P1,861,000.00.
The prosecution anchored its case on the testimony of Anna de Dios (private complainant),
and the Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) executed between the private complainant and
the petitioner. The gist of the MOA provides: (1) the petitioner’s acknowledgment and
receipt, on various dates, of jewelries from the private complainant amounting to P1,861,000.00;
(2) the petitioner failed to remit the proceeds of the sale of the subject jewelries; and
(3) the private complainant filed the estafa case against the petitioner for the
non-remittance of the proceeds of the sale of the jewelries.
First, the offense of estafa, in general, is committed either by
(a) abuse of confidence or
(b) means of deceit.
The acts constituting estafa committed with abuse of confidence
are enumerated in item (1) of Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code,
as amended; item (2) of Article 315 enumerates estafa committed by
means of deceit. Deceit is not an essential requisite of estafa
by abuse of confidence; the breach of confidence takes the place
of fraud or deceit, which is a usual element in the other estafas.
In this case, the charge against the petitioner and her subsequent
conviction was for estafa committed by abuse of confidence. Thus,
it was not necessary for the prosecution to prove deceit as this
was not an element of the estafa that the petitioner was charged
with.
Nevertheless, we find the modification of the penalty imposed to
be in order to conform to the prevailing jurisprudence. The
second paragraph of Article 315 provides the appropriate
penalty if the value of the thing, or the amount defrauded,
exceeds P22,000.00:
1st. The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period
to prision mayor in its minimum period, if the amount of the
fraud is over 12,000 pesos but does not exceed 22,000 pesos; and
if such amount exceeds the latter sum, the penalty provided in
this paragraph shall be imposed in its maximum period,
adding one year for each additional 10,000 pesos; but the total
penalty which may be imposed shall not exceed twenty years.
The minimum term of imprisonment imposed by the CA and the
RTC does not conform with the Court’s ruling in People v. Temporada,
where we held that the minimum indeterminate penalty in the above
provision shall be one degree lower from the prescribed penalty
for estafa which is anywhere within the range of prision
correccional, in its minimum and medium periods, or six (6) months
and one (1) day to four (4) years and two (2) months. In this
case, the minimum term imposed by the CA and the RTC of six
(6) years and six (6) months of prision mayor is modified to
four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional,
consistent with the prevailing jurisprudence.
CARMINA G. BROKMANN,
Petitioner,
VS
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Respondent.
G.R. No. 199150,February 6, 2012
petitioner to return or remit the proceeds of jewelries amounting to P1,861,000.00.
The prosecution anchored its case on the testimony of Anna de Dios (private complainant),
and the Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) executed between the private complainant and
the petitioner. The gist of the MOA provides: (1) the petitioner’s acknowledgment and
receipt, on various dates, of jewelries from the private complainant amounting to P1,861,000.00;
(2) the petitioner failed to remit the proceeds of the sale of the subject jewelries; and
(3) the private complainant filed the estafa case against the petitioner for the
non-remittance of the proceeds of the sale of the jewelries.
First, the offense of estafa, in general, is committed either by
(a) abuse of confidence or
(b) means of deceit.
The acts constituting estafa committed with abuse of confidence
are enumerated in item (1) of Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code,
as amended; item (2) of Article 315 enumerates estafa committed by
means of deceit. Deceit is not an essential requisite of estafa
by abuse of confidence; the breach of confidence takes the place
of fraud or deceit, which is a usual element in the other estafas.
In this case, the charge against the petitioner and her subsequent
conviction was for estafa committed by abuse of confidence. Thus,
it was not necessary for the prosecution to prove deceit as this
was not an element of the estafa that the petitioner was charged
with.
Nevertheless, we find the modification of the penalty imposed to
be in order to conform to the prevailing jurisprudence. The
second paragraph of Article 315 provides the appropriate
penalty if the value of the thing, or the amount defrauded,
exceeds P22,000.00:
1st. The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period
to prision mayor in its minimum period, if the amount of the
fraud is over 12,000 pesos but does not exceed 22,000 pesos; and
if such amount exceeds the latter sum, the penalty provided in
this paragraph shall be imposed in its maximum period,
adding one year for each additional 10,000 pesos; but the total
penalty which may be imposed shall not exceed twenty years.
The minimum term of imprisonment imposed by the CA and the
RTC does not conform with the Court’s ruling in People v. Temporada,
where we held that the minimum indeterminate penalty in the above
provision shall be one degree lower from the prescribed penalty
for estafa which is anywhere within the range of prision
correccional, in its minimum and medium periods, or six (6) months
and one (1) day to four (4) years and two (2) months. In this
case, the minimum term imposed by the CA and the RTC of six
(6) years and six (6) months of prision mayor is modified to
four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional,
consistent with the prevailing jurisprudence.
CARMINA G. BROKMANN,
Petitioner,
VS
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Respondent.
G.R. No. 199150,February 6, 2012
Wednesday, March 18, 2015
DOCTRINE OF RES IPSA LOQUITOR
DOCTRINE OF RES IPSA LOQUITOR
MALAYAN INSURANCE CO., INC.,
Petitioner,
RODELIO ALBERTO and
ENRICO ALBERTO REYES,
Respondents.
G.R. No. 194320, G.R. No. 194320, February 1, 2012
What is at once evident from the instant case, however,
is the presence of all the requisites for the application
of the rule of res ipsa loquitur. To reiterate, res ipsa
loquitur is a rule of necessity which applies where evidence
is absent or not readily available. As explained in D.M.
Consunji, Inc., it is partly based upon the theory that
the defendant in charge of the instrumentality which causes
the injury either knows the cause of the accident or has the
best opportunity of ascertaining it and that the plaintiff
has no such knowledge, and, therefore, is compelled to allege
negligence in general terms and to rely upon the proof of
the happening of the accident in order to establish negligence.
As mentioned above, the requisites for the application of
the res ipsa loquitur rule are the following:
(1) the accident was of a kind which does not ordinarily
occur unless someone is negligent;
(2) the instrumentality or agency which caused the injury
was under the exclusive control of the person charged with
negligence; and
(3) the injury suffered must not have been due to any voluntary
action or contribution on the part of the person injured.
In the instant case, the Fuzo Cargo Truck would not have had
hit the rear end of the Mitsubishi Galant unless someone is
negligent. Also, the Fuzo Cargo Truck was under the exclusive
control of its driver, Reyes. Even if respondents avert
liability by putting the blame on the Nissan Bus driver, still,
this allegation was self-serving and totally unfounded. Finally,
no contributory negligence was attributed to the driver of
the Mitsubishi Galant. Consequently, all the requisites for
the application of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur are present,
thereby creating a reasonable presumption of negligence on the part
of respondents.
MALAYAN INSURANCE CO., INC.,
Petitioner,
RODELIO ALBERTO and
ENRICO ALBERTO REYES,
Respondents.
G.R. No. 194320, G.R. No. 194320, February 1, 2012
What is at once evident from the instant case, however,
is the presence of all the requisites for the application
of the rule of res ipsa loquitur. To reiterate, res ipsa
loquitur is a rule of necessity which applies where evidence
is absent or not readily available. As explained in D.M.
Consunji, Inc., it is partly based upon the theory that
the defendant in charge of the instrumentality which causes
the injury either knows the cause of the accident or has the
best opportunity of ascertaining it and that the plaintiff
has no such knowledge, and, therefore, is compelled to allege
negligence in general terms and to rely upon the proof of
the happening of the accident in order to establish negligence.
As mentioned above, the requisites for the application of
the res ipsa loquitur rule are the following:
(1) the accident was of a kind which does not ordinarily
occur unless someone is negligent;
(2) the instrumentality or agency which caused the injury
was under the exclusive control of the person charged with
negligence; and
(3) the injury suffered must not have been due to any voluntary
action or contribution on the part of the person injured.
In the instant case, the Fuzo Cargo Truck would not have had
hit the rear end of the Mitsubishi Galant unless someone is
negligent. Also, the Fuzo Cargo Truck was under the exclusive
control of its driver, Reyes. Even if respondents avert
liability by putting the blame on the Nissan Bus driver, still,
this allegation was self-serving and totally unfounded. Finally,
no contributory negligence was attributed to the driver of
the Mitsubishi Galant. Consequently, all the requisites for
the application of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur are present,
thereby creating a reasonable presumption of negligence on the part
of respondents.
Monday, March 9, 2015
PRISCILLA ALMA JOSE, Petitioner RAMON C. JAVELLANA, ET AL., G.R. No. 158239. January 25, 2012
The denial of a motion for reconsideration of an order granting the defending party’s motion to dismiss is not an interlocutory but a final order because it puts an end to the particular matter involved, or settles definitely the matter therein disposed of, as to leave nothing for the trial court to do other than to execute the order. Accordingly, the claiming party has a fresh period of 15 days from notice of the denial within which to appeal the denial.
First of all, the denial of Javellana’s motion for reconsideration left nothing more to be done by the RTC because it confirmed the dismissal of Civil Case No. 79-M-97. It was clearly a final order, not an interlocutory one. The Court has distinguished between final and interlocutory orders in Pahila-Garrido v. Tortogo, thuswise:
The distinction between a final order and an interlocutory order is well known. The first disposes of the subject matter in its entirety or terminates a particular proceeding or action, leaving nothing more to be done except to enforce by execution what the court has determined, but the latter does not completely dispose of the case but leaves something else to be decided upon. An interlocutory order deals with preliminary matters and the trial on the merits is yet to be held and the judgment rendered. The test to ascertain whether or not an order or a judgment is
interlocutory or final is: does the order or judgment leave something to be done in the trial court with respect to the merits of the case? If it does, the order or judgment is interlocutory; otherwise, it is final.
And, secondly, whether an order is final or interlocutory determines whether appeal is the correct remedy or not. A final order is appealable, to accord with the final judgment rule enunciated in Section 1, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court to the effect that “appeal may be taken from a judgment or final order that completely disposes of the case, or of a particular matter therein when declared by these Rules to be appealable;”[23] but the remedy from an interlocutory one is not an appeal but a special civil action for certiorari. The explanation for the differentiation of remedies given in Pahila-Garrido v. Tortogo is apt:
xxx The reason for disallowing an appeal from an interlocutory order is to avoid multiplicity of appeals in a single action, which necessarily suspends the hearing and decision on the merits of the action during the pendency of the appeals. Permitting multiple appeals will necessarily delay the trial on the merits of the case for a considerable length of time, and will compel the adverse party to incur unnecessary expenses, for one of the parties may interpose as many appeals as there are incidental questions raised by him and as there are interlocutory orders rendered or issued by the lower court. An interlocutory order may be the subject of an appeal, but only after a judgment has been rendered, with the ground for appealing the order being included in the appeal of the judgment itself.
The remedy against an interlocutory order not subject of an appeal is an appropriate special civil action under Rule 65, provided that the interlocutory order is rendered without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion. Then is certiorari under Rule 65 allowed to be resorted to.
First of all, the denial of Javellana’s motion for reconsideration left nothing more to be done by the RTC because it confirmed the dismissal of Civil Case No. 79-M-97. It was clearly a final order, not an interlocutory one. The Court has distinguished between final and interlocutory orders in Pahila-Garrido v. Tortogo, thuswise:
The distinction between a final order and an interlocutory order is well known. The first disposes of the subject matter in its entirety or terminates a particular proceeding or action, leaving nothing more to be done except to enforce by execution what the court has determined, but the latter does not completely dispose of the case but leaves something else to be decided upon. An interlocutory order deals with preliminary matters and the trial on the merits is yet to be held and the judgment rendered. The test to ascertain whether or not an order or a judgment is
interlocutory or final is: does the order or judgment leave something to be done in the trial court with respect to the merits of the case? If it does, the order or judgment is interlocutory; otherwise, it is final.
And, secondly, whether an order is final or interlocutory determines whether appeal is the correct remedy or not. A final order is appealable, to accord with the final judgment rule enunciated in Section 1, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court to the effect that “appeal may be taken from a judgment or final order that completely disposes of the case, or of a particular matter therein when declared by these Rules to be appealable;”[23] but the remedy from an interlocutory one is not an appeal but a special civil action for certiorari. The explanation for the differentiation of remedies given in Pahila-Garrido v. Tortogo is apt:
xxx The reason for disallowing an appeal from an interlocutory order is to avoid multiplicity of appeals in a single action, which necessarily suspends the hearing and decision on the merits of the action during the pendency of the appeals. Permitting multiple appeals will necessarily delay the trial on the merits of the case for a considerable length of time, and will compel the adverse party to incur unnecessary expenses, for one of the parties may interpose as many appeals as there are incidental questions raised by him and as there are interlocutory orders rendered or issued by the lower court. An interlocutory order may be the subject of an appeal, but only after a judgment has been rendered, with the ground for appealing the order being included in the appeal of the judgment itself.
The remedy against an interlocutory order not subject of an appeal is an appropriate special civil action under Rule 65, provided that the interlocutory order is rendered without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion. Then is certiorari under Rule 65 allowed to be resorted to.
ADVENT CAPITAL AND FINANCE CORPORATION, vs NICASIO I. ALCANTARA and EDITHA I. ALCANTARA G.R. No. 183050, January 25, 2012
This case is about the validity of a rehabilitation court’s order that compelled a third party, in possession of money allegedly belonging to the debtor of a company under rehabilitation, to deliver such money to its court-appointed receiver over the debtor’s objection.
The Issue Presented
The sole issue in this case is whether or not the cash dividends held by Belson and claimed by both the Alcantaras and Advent Capital constitute corporate assets of the latter that the rehabilitation court may, upon motion, require to be conveyed to the rehabilitation receiver for his disposition.
Decision:
Advent Capital must file a separate action for collection to recover the trust fees that it allegedly earned and, with the trial court’s authorization if warranted, put the money in escrow for payment to whoever it rightly belongs. Having failed to collect the trust fees at the end of each calendar quarter as stated in the contract, all it had against the Alcantaras was a claim for payment which is a proper subject for an ordinary action for collection. It cannot enforce its money claim by simply filing a motion in the rehabilitation case for delivery of money belonging to the Alcantaras but in the possession of a third party.
Rehabilitation proceedings are summary and non-adversarial in nature, and do not contemplate adjudication of claims that must be threshed out in ordinary court proceedings. Adversarial proceedings similar to that in ordinary courts are inconsistent with the commercial nature of a rehabilitation case. The latter must be resolved quickly and expeditiously for the sake of the corporate debtor, its creditors and other interested parties. Thus, the Interim Rules “incorporate the concept of prohibited pleadings, affidavit evidence in lieu of oral testimony, clarificatory hearings instead of the traditional approach of receiving evidence, and the grant of authority to the court to decide the case, or any incident, on the basis of affidavits and documentary evidence.
The Issue Presented
The sole issue in this case is whether or not the cash dividends held by Belson and claimed by both the Alcantaras and Advent Capital constitute corporate assets of the latter that the rehabilitation court may, upon motion, require to be conveyed to the rehabilitation receiver for his disposition.
Decision:
Advent Capital must file a separate action for collection to recover the trust fees that it allegedly earned and, with the trial court’s authorization if warranted, put the money in escrow for payment to whoever it rightly belongs. Having failed to collect the trust fees at the end of each calendar quarter as stated in the contract, all it had against the Alcantaras was a claim for payment which is a proper subject for an ordinary action for collection. It cannot enforce its money claim by simply filing a motion in the rehabilitation case for delivery of money belonging to the Alcantaras but in the possession of a third party.
Rehabilitation proceedings are summary and non-adversarial in nature, and do not contemplate adjudication of claims that must be threshed out in ordinary court proceedings. Adversarial proceedings similar to that in ordinary courts are inconsistent with the commercial nature of a rehabilitation case. The latter must be resolved quickly and expeditiously for the sake of the corporate debtor, its creditors and other interested parties. Thus, the Interim Rules “incorporate the concept of prohibited pleadings, affidavit evidence in lieu of oral testimony, clarificatory hearings instead of the traditional approach of receiving evidence, and the grant of authority to the court to decide the case, or any incident, on the basis of affidavits and documentary evidence.
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)