PRISCILLA ALMA JOSE, Petitioner RAMON C. JAVELLANA, ET AL., G.R. No. 158239. January 25, 2012

The denial of a motion for reconsideration of an order granting the defending party’s motion to dismiss is not an interlocutory but a final order because it puts an end to the particular matter involved, or settles definitely the matter therein disposed of, as to leave nothing for the trial court to do other than to execute the order. Accordingly, the claiming party has a fresh period of 15 days from notice of the denial within which to appeal the denial.

First of all, the denial of Javellana’s motion for reconsideration left nothing more to be done by the RTC because it confirmed the dismissal of Civil Case No. 79-M-97. It was clearly a final order, not an interlocutory one. The Court has distinguished between final and interlocutory orders in Pahila-Garrido v. Tortogo, thuswise:

The distinction between a final order and an interlocutory order is well known. The first disposes of the subject matter in its entirety or terminates a particular proceeding or action, leaving nothing more to be done except to enforce by execution what the court has determined, but the latter does not completely dispose of the case but leaves something else to be decided upon.  An interlocutory order deals with preliminary matters and the trial on the merits is yet to be held and the judgment rendered.  The  test  to  ascertain  whether  or not an order or a judgment is

interlocutory or final is: does the order or judgment leave something to be done in the trial court with respect to the merits of the case?  If it does, the order or judgment is interlocutory; otherwise, it is final.


And, secondly, whether an order is final or interlocutory determines whether appeal is the correct remedy or not. A final order is appealable, to accord with the final judgment rule enunciated in Section 1, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court to the effect that “appeal may be taken from a judgment or final order that completely disposes of the case, or of a particular matter therein when declared by these Rules to be appealable;”[23] but the remedy from an interlocutory one is not an appeal but a special civil action for certiorari. The explanation for the differentiation of remedies given in Pahila-Garrido v. Tortogo is apt:

xxx The reason for disallowing an appeal from an interlocutory order is to avoid multiplicity of appeals in a single action, which necessarily suspends the hearing and decision on the merits of the action during the pendency of the appeals. Permitting multiple appeals will necessarily delay the trial on the merits of the case for a considerable length of time, and will compel the adverse party to incur unnecessary expenses, for one of the parties may interpose as many appeals as there are incidental questions raised by him and as there are interlocutory orders rendered or issued by the lower court. An interlocutory order may be the subject of an appeal, but only after a judgment has been rendered, with the ground for appealing the order being included in the appeal of the judgment itself.

The remedy against an interlocutory order not subject of an appeal is an appropriate special civil action under Rule 65, provided that the interlocutory order is rendered without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion. Then is certiorari under Rule 65 allowed to be resorted to.