As borne by the records, the criminal charge stemmed from the failure of the
petitioner to return or remit the proceeds of jewelries amounting to P1,861,000.00.
The prosecution anchored its case on the testimony of Anna de Dios (private complainant),
and the Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) executed between the private complainant and
the petitioner. The gist of the MOA provides: (1) the petitioner’s acknowledgment and
receipt, on various dates, of jewelries from the private complainant amounting to P1,861,000.00;
(2) the petitioner failed to remit the proceeds of the sale of the subject jewelries; and
(3) the private complainant filed the estafa case against the petitioner for the
non-remittance of the proceeds of the sale of the jewelries.
First, the offense of estafa, in general, is committed either by
(a) abuse of confidence or
(b) means of deceit.
The acts constituting estafa committed with abuse of confidence
are enumerated in item (1) of Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code,
as amended; item (2) of Article 315 enumerates estafa committed by
means of deceit. Deceit is not an essential requisite of estafa
by abuse of confidence; the breach of confidence takes the place
of fraud or deceit, which is a usual element in the other estafas.
In this case, the charge against the petitioner and her subsequent
conviction was for estafa committed by abuse of confidence. Thus,
it was not necessary for the prosecution to prove deceit as this
was not an element of the estafa that the petitioner was charged
with.
Nevertheless, we find the modification of the penalty imposed to
be in order to conform to the prevailing jurisprudence. The
second paragraph of Article 315 provides the appropriate
penalty if the value of the thing, or the amount defrauded,
exceeds P22,000.00:
1st. The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period
to prision mayor in its minimum period, if the amount of the
fraud is over 12,000 pesos but does not exceed 22,000 pesos; and
if such amount exceeds the latter sum, the penalty provided in
this paragraph shall be imposed in its maximum period,
adding one year for each additional 10,000 pesos; but the total
penalty which may be imposed shall not exceed twenty years.
The minimum term of imprisonment imposed by the CA and the
RTC does not conform with the Court’s ruling in People v. Temporada,
where we held that the minimum indeterminate penalty in the above
provision shall be one degree lower from the prescribed penalty
for estafa which is anywhere within the range of prision
correccional, in its minimum and medium periods, or six (6) months
and one (1) day to four (4) years and two (2) months. In this
case, the minimum term imposed by the CA and the RTC of six
(6) years and six (6) months of prision mayor is modified to
four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional,
consistent with the prevailing jurisprudence.
CARMINA G. BROKMANN,
Petitioner,
VS
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Respondent.
G.R. No. 199150,February 6, 2012
Tuesday, March 24, 2015
Wednesday, March 18, 2015
DOCTRINE OF RES IPSA LOQUITOR
DOCTRINE OF RES IPSA LOQUITOR
MALAYAN INSURANCE CO., INC.,
Petitioner,
RODELIO ALBERTO and
ENRICO ALBERTO REYES,
Respondents.
G.R. No. 194320, G.R. No. 194320, February 1, 2012
What is at once evident from the instant case, however,
is the presence of all the requisites for the application
of the rule of res ipsa loquitur. To reiterate, res ipsa
loquitur is a rule of necessity which applies where evidence
is absent or not readily available. As explained in D.M.
Consunji, Inc., it is partly based upon the theory that
the defendant in charge of the instrumentality which causes
the injury either knows the cause of the accident or has the
best opportunity of ascertaining it and that the plaintiff
has no such knowledge, and, therefore, is compelled to allege
negligence in general terms and to rely upon the proof of
the happening of the accident in order to establish negligence.
As mentioned above, the requisites for the application of
the res ipsa loquitur rule are the following:
(1) the accident was of a kind which does not ordinarily
occur unless someone is negligent;
(2) the instrumentality or agency which caused the injury
was under the exclusive control of the person charged with
negligence; and
(3) the injury suffered must not have been due to any voluntary
action or contribution on the part of the person injured.
In the instant case, the Fuzo Cargo Truck would not have had
hit the rear end of the Mitsubishi Galant unless someone is
negligent. Also, the Fuzo Cargo Truck was under the exclusive
control of its driver, Reyes. Even if respondents avert
liability by putting the blame on the Nissan Bus driver, still,
this allegation was self-serving and totally unfounded. Finally,
no contributory negligence was attributed to the driver of
the Mitsubishi Galant. Consequently, all the requisites for
the application of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur are present,
thereby creating a reasonable presumption of negligence on the part
of respondents.
MALAYAN INSURANCE CO., INC.,
Petitioner,
RODELIO ALBERTO and
ENRICO ALBERTO REYES,
Respondents.
G.R. No. 194320, G.R. No. 194320, February 1, 2012
What is at once evident from the instant case, however,
is the presence of all the requisites for the application
of the rule of res ipsa loquitur. To reiterate, res ipsa
loquitur is a rule of necessity which applies where evidence
is absent or not readily available. As explained in D.M.
Consunji, Inc., it is partly based upon the theory that
the defendant in charge of the instrumentality which causes
the injury either knows the cause of the accident or has the
best opportunity of ascertaining it and that the plaintiff
has no such knowledge, and, therefore, is compelled to allege
negligence in general terms and to rely upon the proof of
the happening of the accident in order to establish negligence.
As mentioned above, the requisites for the application of
the res ipsa loquitur rule are the following:
(1) the accident was of a kind which does not ordinarily
occur unless someone is negligent;
(2) the instrumentality or agency which caused the injury
was under the exclusive control of the person charged with
negligence; and
(3) the injury suffered must not have been due to any voluntary
action or contribution on the part of the person injured.
In the instant case, the Fuzo Cargo Truck would not have had
hit the rear end of the Mitsubishi Galant unless someone is
negligent. Also, the Fuzo Cargo Truck was under the exclusive
control of its driver, Reyes. Even if respondents avert
liability by putting the blame on the Nissan Bus driver, still,
this allegation was self-serving and totally unfounded. Finally,
no contributory negligence was attributed to the driver of
the Mitsubishi Galant. Consequently, all the requisites for
the application of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur are present,
thereby creating a reasonable presumption of negligence on the part
of respondents.
Monday, March 9, 2015
PRISCILLA ALMA JOSE, Petitioner RAMON C. JAVELLANA, ET AL., G.R. No. 158239. January 25, 2012
The denial of a motion for reconsideration of an order granting the defending party’s motion to dismiss is not an interlocutory but a final order because it puts an end to the particular matter involved, or settles definitely the matter therein disposed of, as to leave nothing for the trial court to do other than to execute the order. Accordingly, the claiming party has a fresh period of 15 days from notice of the denial within which to appeal the denial.
First of all, the denial of Javellana’s motion for reconsideration left nothing more to be done by the RTC because it confirmed the dismissal of Civil Case No. 79-M-97. It was clearly a final order, not an interlocutory one. The Court has distinguished between final and interlocutory orders in Pahila-Garrido v. Tortogo, thuswise:
The distinction between a final order and an interlocutory order is well known. The first disposes of the subject matter in its entirety or terminates a particular proceeding or action, leaving nothing more to be done except to enforce by execution what the court has determined, but the latter does not completely dispose of the case but leaves something else to be decided upon. An interlocutory order deals with preliminary matters and the trial on the merits is yet to be held and the judgment rendered. The test to ascertain whether or not an order or a judgment is
interlocutory or final is: does the order or judgment leave something to be done in the trial court with respect to the merits of the case? If it does, the order or judgment is interlocutory; otherwise, it is final.
And, secondly, whether an order is final or interlocutory determines whether appeal is the correct remedy or not. A final order is appealable, to accord with the final judgment rule enunciated in Section 1, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court to the effect that “appeal may be taken from a judgment or final order that completely disposes of the case, or of a particular matter therein when declared by these Rules to be appealable;”[23] but the remedy from an interlocutory one is not an appeal but a special civil action for certiorari. The explanation for the differentiation of remedies given in Pahila-Garrido v. Tortogo is apt:
xxx The reason for disallowing an appeal from an interlocutory order is to avoid multiplicity of appeals in a single action, which necessarily suspends the hearing and decision on the merits of the action during the pendency of the appeals. Permitting multiple appeals will necessarily delay the trial on the merits of the case for a considerable length of time, and will compel the adverse party to incur unnecessary expenses, for one of the parties may interpose as many appeals as there are incidental questions raised by him and as there are interlocutory orders rendered or issued by the lower court. An interlocutory order may be the subject of an appeal, but only after a judgment has been rendered, with the ground for appealing the order being included in the appeal of the judgment itself.
The remedy against an interlocutory order not subject of an appeal is an appropriate special civil action under Rule 65, provided that the interlocutory order is rendered without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion. Then is certiorari under Rule 65 allowed to be resorted to.
First of all, the denial of Javellana’s motion for reconsideration left nothing more to be done by the RTC because it confirmed the dismissal of Civil Case No. 79-M-97. It was clearly a final order, not an interlocutory one. The Court has distinguished between final and interlocutory orders in Pahila-Garrido v. Tortogo, thuswise:
The distinction between a final order and an interlocutory order is well known. The first disposes of the subject matter in its entirety or terminates a particular proceeding or action, leaving nothing more to be done except to enforce by execution what the court has determined, but the latter does not completely dispose of the case but leaves something else to be decided upon. An interlocutory order deals with preliminary matters and the trial on the merits is yet to be held and the judgment rendered. The test to ascertain whether or not an order or a judgment is
interlocutory or final is: does the order or judgment leave something to be done in the trial court with respect to the merits of the case? If it does, the order or judgment is interlocutory; otherwise, it is final.
And, secondly, whether an order is final or interlocutory determines whether appeal is the correct remedy or not. A final order is appealable, to accord with the final judgment rule enunciated in Section 1, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court to the effect that “appeal may be taken from a judgment or final order that completely disposes of the case, or of a particular matter therein when declared by these Rules to be appealable;”[23] but the remedy from an interlocutory one is not an appeal but a special civil action for certiorari. The explanation for the differentiation of remedies given in Pahila-Garrido v. Tortogo is apt:
xxx The reason for disallowing an appeal from an interlocutory order is to avoid multiplicity of appeals in a single action, which necessarily suspends the hearing and decision on the merits of the action during the pendency of the appeals. Permitting multiple appeals will necessarily delay the trial on the merits of the case for a considerable length of time, and will compel the adverse party to incur unnecessary expenses, for one of the parties may interpose as many appeals as there are incidental questions raised by him and as there are interlocutory orders rendered or issued by the lower court. An interlocutory order may be the subject of an appeal, but only after a judgment has been rendered, with the ground for appealing the order being included in the appeal of the judgment itself.
The remedy against an interlocutory order not subject of an appeal is an appropriate special civil action under Rule 65, provided that the interlocutory order is rendered without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion. Then is certiorari under Rule 65 allowed to be resorted to.
ADVENT CAPITAL AND FINANCE CORPORATION, vs NICASIO I. ALCANTARA and EDITHA I. ALCANTARA G.R. No. 183050, January 25, 2012
This case is about the validity of a rehabilitation court’s order that compelled a third party, in possession of money allegedly belonging to the debtor of a company under rehabilitation, to deliver such money to its court-appointed receiver over the debtor’s objection.
The Issue Presented
The sole issue in this case is whether or not the cash dividends held by Belson and claimed by both the Alcantaras and Advent Capital constitute corporate assets of the latter that the rehabilitation court may, upon motion, require to be conveyed to the rehabilitation receiver for his disposition.
Decision:
Advent Capital must file a separate action for collection to recover the trust fees that it allegedly earned and, with the trial court’s authorization if warranted, put the money in escrow for payment to whoever it rightly belongs. Having failed to collect the trust fees at the end of each calendar quarter as stated in the contract, all it had against the Alcantaras was a claim for payment which is a proper subject for an ordinary action for collection. It cannot enforce its money claim by simply filing a motion in the rehabilitation case for delivery of money belonging to the Alcantaras but in the possession of a third party.
Rehabilitation proceedings are summary and non-adversarial in nature, and do not contemplate adjudication of claims that must be threshed out in ordinary court proceedings. Adversarial proceedings similar to that in ordinary courts are inconsistent with the commercial nature of a rehabilitation case. The latter must be resolved quickly and expeditiously for the sake of the corporate debtor, its creditors and other interested parties. Thus, the Interim Rules “incorporate the concept of prohibited pleadings, affidavit evidence in lieu of oral testimony, clarificatory hearings instead of the traditional approach of receiving evidence, and the grant of authority to the court to decide the case, or any incident, on the basis of affidavits and documentary evidence.
The Issue Presented
The sole issue in this case is whether or not the cash dividends held by Belson and claimed by both the Alcantaras and Advent Capital constitute corporate assets of the latter that the rehabilitation court may, upon motion, require to be conveyed to the rehabilitation receiver for his disposition.
Decision:
Advent Capital must file a separate action for collection to recover the trust fees that it allegedly earned and, with the trial court’s authorization if warranted, put the money in escrow for payment to whoever it rightly belongs. Having failed to collect the trust fees at the end of each calendar quarter as stated in the contract, all it had against the Alcantaras was a claim for payment which is a proper subject for an ordinary action for collection. It cannot enforce its money claim by simply filing a motion in the rehabilitation case for delivery of money belonging to the Alcantaras but in the possession of a third party.
Rehabilitation proceedings are summary and non-adversarial in nature, and do not contemplate adjudication of claims that must be threshed out in ordinary court proceedings. Adversarial proceedings similar to that in ordinary courts are inconsistent with the commercial nature of a rehabilitation case. The latter must be resolved quickly and expeditiously for the sake of the corporate debtor, its creditors and other interested parties. Thus, the Interim Rules “incorporate the concept of prohibited pleadings, affidavit evidence in lieu of oral testimony, clarificatory hearings instead of the traditional approach of receiving evidence, and the grant of authority to the court to decide the case, or any incident, on the basis of affidavits and documentary evidence.
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